NEW CASE STUDY: AIRCRAFT CARRIER TACTICS

World War II Aircraft Carrier Tactics: The Ingredients of Victory

The Warfare Mastery Institute’s first case study will focus on Carrier Tactics in the South and Central Pacific from 1941-1945. The main objective of the case study is to understand what critical factors (or ingredients) contributed to victory in carrier combat. If we were forced to fight a World War II carrier battle again, what key concepts, tactics, techniques, procedures and technologies would give us a marked advantage over the adversary?

The value of such a study goes beyond historical interest. First, because all forms of warfare and combat revolve around similar themes and concepts, lessons from World War II carrier battles that relate to planning, timing, reconnaissance, command and control could prove useful across multiple domains and eras of conflict. Second, in an era where the very utility of carriers is uncertain due to the proliferation of guided anti-ship missiles, studying the nature of carrier combat in its heyday might help us better understand the role of carriers in present and future conflicts.

As mentioned in our introductory blog post, WMI does not wait until a case study is complete to publish it. Rather, we never consider a case study or book “finished” but treat each publication and resource as a “living” and ever-evolving project. Thus, as we begin this project and enlist the help of outside authors and experts, we have as many questions as we have answers and do not know the exact course the study will take. However, from our initial analysis and research we have highlighted several key themes and concepts that we believe will be important to our objective of identifying the key ingredients of victory in World War II carrier combat. 

TOPIC 1: Scouting and Reconnaissance 

It is clear that in order to win in carrier vs. carrier combat, your reconnaissance elements must first locate the enemy. Then, once you launch strike aircraft, they must be able to arrive at the right time and place to deliver ordnance on target. There are many occasions throughout the Pacific War when both sides failed to accomplish one or both of these key tasks and few historians would argue that such mistakes had a significant effect on the course of battles and campaigns.

While many current books and studies point out such mistakes and in some cases offer reasons for why they occurred, there is not as much attention on what specific actions leaders on both sides might have taken to improve their performance and avoid such mistakes in the first place. To attempt to answer this question we plan to examine scouting and reconnaissance tactics, techniques, procedures, training and doctrine on both sides at various points in the war in as much detail as possible.

Ideally, you want to see the enemy before he sees you and strike him before he has a chance to hit back. As both sides strove to accomplish these goals in the Pacific, what worked and what didn’t? What specific procedures and systems reduced friction and minimized the chances of mistakes? Which command and leadership styles had a positive effect and which proved counterproductive? In what cases was failure simply the result of bad luck and in what cases might it have been avoided? Answering such questions will not only help illuminate the nature of carrier combat but will offer important lessons for all domains of warfare. 

TOPIC 2: Decision Cycles, Timing, Maintenance and Flight Deck Operations

While effective scouting and attacking effectively first is a critical ingredient of victory in carrier operations, history shows that the second or third attack can often be as decisive or more decisive than the first strike. Compared to some other forms of warfare, carrier operations involve slower decision-action cycles since it takes time to find the enemy, prep aircraft, launch aircraft, fly to the target, attack, return from the target, recover aircraft and then prep for another strike. As the battle unfolds the speed and timing of these competitive cycles contributes greatly to success or failure.

While in some cases, good timing might simply be the result of luck, were there other cases where leaders and planners on either side took specific actions that led to an advantage in this decision-cycle competition. Some outstanding studies have already shed light on certain approaches to flight deck operations that proved more efficient than others. However, is achieving a faster cycle always the most important aim? Are there ways to better understand the interplay of decision cycles that can make us less reliant on luck for success? In what historical cases did reconnaissance, planning, maintenance and flight deck operations come together in the most effective ways?

TOPIC 3: Risk Management and Damage Control

The speed of decision-action cycles by nature tends to increase risk. Maybe the quickest and most efficient way to fuel and spot aircraft also leaves the carrier more vulnerable to damage from enemy bombs. Conversely, excessive focus on risk mitigation generally slows the decision-action cycle to the point where a force becomes entirely passive, defensive and loses the initiative.

Our aim is to better understand the interplay of tempo and risk and identify key procedures and approaches that proved effective while highlighting critical mistakes that led to failure. While it is easy to pass judgement with the benefit of hindsight, it should still be possible to identify specific damage control and risk mitigation practices that show a pattern of success over time. It is likely that many of these best practices have persisted and now form the bedrock of modern naval damage control doctrine. However, it is also possible that some of these lessons and best practices have been forgotten over the years.

TOPIC 4: Technology and Industrial Capacity

Many historians have pointed out that while tactical-level victories might have had some effect on the course of the war, they are ultimately overshadowed by the larger trends in the strategic and industrial balance between the United States and Japan. Though it would be difficult to refute this age-old argument, this study seeks to understand its nature more deeply. Were there any points when tactical superiority or decisive victory might have been able to irreversibly tip the strategic scale?

We also seek to understand which aspects of technological and industrial superiority were the most decisive? Which factors contributed the most to victory: pilot training, fighter performance, anti-aircraft weapons, radar? It is also important to ask which factors were the most “changeable.” As a military professional, it is useful to know which factors are the most decisive, but it can be more important to know which factors you can realistically change to alter the battlefield equation with the time and resources available to you.